This study is to investigate the relationship between Corporate Governance (CG) 
performance in Hong Kong based family-controlled property development companies, but also the China based property development companies.
Importance of Corporate Governance after the Financial and Accounting Scandals
For the financial and accounting scandals of the collapse of the US companies -Enron Corporation and WorldCom Corporation in 2001 and 2002 respectively, it showed the critical importance of the structure reforms of governance in companies (Lee, 2006) . Corporate
Governance was in need of improvement. Afterwards, the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted in USA to introduce the new standards for financial practices and CG in 2002 so as to reduce the agency costs and to provide the investors with reliable and accurate corporate disclosure and financial reporting.
CG was not a main concern in East Asia (Nowland, 2007) . After the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, it was discovered that the crisis was mainly caused by the structural weaknesses with lack of CG in Asian's companies (Ho, 2003) . It was proved that the companies with poor CG had a larger plunge in asset prices and stock market declines (Johnson et al., 1998) . Thus CG has been identified as an important area needed to improve for protecting the stakeholder interests (McGunagle, 2007) .
Many Asian companies are controlled by families with concentrated ownership (Ho, 2003; Filatotchev et al. 2005; La Porta et al. 1999) . It is stated that the family-controlled companies expose to the agency problems without separation of ownership and control. Hence, the governance mechanisms may not be necessary for the family-controlled company (Schulze et al., 2001) .
There are the studies of the agency threats and costs in family-controlled company with influence on company performance.
Effects of Family-Controlled Company on Company Performance
Demestz and Lehn (1985) state that the concentrated ownership by the family-owners has greater incentives in monitoring the managers, thus the agency costs reduced by aligning the interests between the shareholders and managers, and the profits and company value are maximized. Moreover, the family-owners view the company as the capital and assets transfer to the next generation (Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006) . Hence, they aim to maximize the firm value and profitability. Chen et al. (2006) and Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) find that a more concentrated ownership with less diffused ownership positively relates to higher company profitability. Martinez, et al. (2007) also suggest that the family-controlled company perform better than the non-family-controlled company with a higher profitability.
In contrast, the families tend to assign the management position to family members who may not possess the relevant and proper knowledge and skills (Schulze et al., 2001) . Moreover, the controlling shareholders may extract private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders through the related-party transactions and special dividends (Ho, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2004; Braun and Sharma, 2007) . It impairs the ability of the companies in strategic planning and maximizing profits. Thus, there is no systematic relation between corporate ownership and company performance (Demestz and Villalonga, 2001 ). Even there is poor performance in family-controlled business (Morck et al., 2000) .
It is an open empirical issue of family-controlled companies performing more successful and with a higher profitability (Ho, 2003) . Some researches indicate that CG can mitigate the agency threats in family-controlled business through monitoring the controlling shareholders and disclosure requirements, and enhancing company performance (Schulze, 2001; Ho, 2003; Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006; Braun and Sharma, 2007) .
Impacts of Corporate Governance on Family-Controlled Company Performance
CG helps in monitoring the controlling shareholders and protecting the minority shareholders, not all the scholars and economists agree it can enhance the performance in family-controlled company. From the empirical study in Taiwan, it shows there is no direct relationship between CG and performance in family-controlled companies where the existence of the independence Chairmen does not appear to affect company performance (Filatotchev et al., 2005) . Thus, CG has no impact on family-controlled company performance. Braun and Sharma (2007) suggest the separation of CEO and Board chair roles in CG. It benefits the shareholders returns and company performance while the family cannot be entrenched through high controlling power. Kula and Tatoglu (2006) in Turkey show that an effective board process in CG contributes to family-controlled company performance as it increases the accountability to both controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. For the overall CG in family-controlled company, Chen et al. (2006) indicate it can re-align the interests between family members in the company and the minority shareholders. Thus, CG has a positive impact on company profitability and operational efficiency.
Relationship between Corporate Governance and Family-Controlled Company's Performance in Hong Kong
The new Code on CG started to apply to all companies listed on SEHK from 1 January 2005 onwards. It lists out the principles and criteria of good Corporate Governance with code provisions and recommended best practices for the listed companies (HKex, 2005) . In addition, almost 90% of Hong Kong listed companies are family-controlled company with a family or shareholder owning more than 25% or more of the company total shares (Jordan, 2008) . However, there is lack of empirical evidence in the relationship between CG and family-controlled company performance in Hong Kong (Ho, 2003) .
Hypotheses Development
With regard to the effects of CG, the agency costs, self control and moral hazards problems are minimized and hence the family-controlled company performance is affected (La Porta, 1999; Ho, 2003 
Research Methods

Checklist for Evaluating the Quality CG Disclosure
A checklist is developed for evaluating the quality of CG disclosure of the sample companies. In the checklist, it is divided into two main bodies, 75 mandatory CG disclosure requirements and specific disclosures for property development companies.
Evaluation of the Quality of CG Disclosure of the Sample Companies
In the evaluation, two scores are given to every mandatory and recommended CG disclosures of the sample companies in their annual reports and web sites while no scores are given to those without disclosure, except for which with an explanation, that one score is given. The total scores in the checklist are 150 scores from mandatory disclosures and 80 scores from recommended disclosures. Each part makes up of 50% when calculating the final scores in CG disclosure of the sample companies. The principle behind is that a company can only get a pass if it fulfills all the mandatory disclosure requirements. Tables 1 and 2 show the scores of both mandatory and recommended CG disclosure and the final scores for Hong Kong based and China based property development companies in three financial years 1 . 
The Measurement of Financial Ratios of Sample Companies
The evaluation of financial performance focuses on profitability of the sample companies. It is measured by operating profit margin (OPM) and net profit margin (NPM). The results of the financial ratios of the sample companies of both Hong Kong based and China based family-controlled property development companies for three financial years 1 .
Data Analysis
For the mandatory CG disclosure requirements, only four companies can get full scores, between the roles of the chairman and chief executive that are exercised by the same individual. However, they have an explanation in their CG report. As a result, they lose one score which can only get 149 scores. In addition, Great Eagle loses further one score that it is only an explanation in CG report in not appointing the non-executive director for a specific term and subject to re-election.
For the recommended CG disclosures, Hysan scores the highest -76 scores while Sun Hung
Kai and Henderson Land score at the lowest -60 scores. The percentages of the scores get in each part of the recommended CG disclosure of the sample companies are calculated in Table 3 . It compares the differences of scores among companies.
The lowest scores of CG disclosure in the three financial years For the special discoveries in Table 3 , some companies get 50% scores in human resources policies as there is only the disclosure of policies of human resources but not the management structure. Another aspect -internal control also is of main concern. It is discovered that not all companies disclose the items of internal control in the recommended CG disclosure, especially the procedures and internal controls for the handling and dissemination of price sensitive information and the criteria for the directors to evaluate the effectiveness of the internal control. Some companies only disclose the benchmark for evaluation that one mark is given but others have not. Even some companies do not declare any details of significant areas of concern which may affect the shareholders. This weakens the monitoring processes to the companies.
Analysis of the Quality of CG Disclosure of the Sample of China Based
Family-Controlled Property Development Companies
Referring to Table 2 , Guangzhou R & F gets the highest final scores -93.1%, while Neo-China
Land gets the lowest -84.0%. Generally, not all the China based family-controlled property development companies have the consistent scores in CG disclosure, such as Agile, China
Overseas and Guangzhou R & F. The scores in the three financial years do not have significant differences which limit to 2 scores. For these companies, there is an improvement in the CG disclosure during the three financial years which have the declaration in the review of the effectiveness of the internal control by the directors, the segregation of the roles of the chairman and chief executive officer, and the quantitative impact on the potential risks and uncertainties respectively. However, China Overseas does less well than before for which it has not indicated the criteria for the directors to evaluate the effectiveness of internal control.
For the mandatory CG disclosure requirements, only four companies can get full marks, Table 4 . It helps to compare the differences of scores among companies in different aspects. For the special discoveries in Table 4 , more disclosure items in the internal control of China based companies are not disclosed than in Hong Kong based. For example, some companies even not define the internal control system. Some companies only get the scores of 0% in acknowledging the responsibility in the social aspects and contributing to the community. The recommended CG disclosures for the China based family-controlled property development companies are weaker than in Hong Kong based. It hinders the monitoring process on the controlling shareholders and hence reducing the ability to protect the minority shareholders. It may be caused by the recently listed companies on the SEHK, such as Agile which was listed on 15.12.2005 that the companies may not have a good establishment in CG disclosure. Also it may be affected by the differences in the culture between Hong Kong and China that China has a higher tolerance in uncertainty about the business operations, internal and external environment (Hofstede, 2003) .
Analysis of the Financial Ratios of the Sample Companies
In order to examine the relationship between CG disclosure and performance in terms of financial ratios, the analysis of the financial ratios can be divided into two parts. First is the trend, and the second is the highest and the lowest average scores of the three financial years 1 for each of the financial ratios of the sample companies. This helps to compare with the trends in the CG disclosure scores. In addition, the scores of financial ratios are subject to fluctuations during the three financial years. It is fair to use the highest and the lowest average scores of the financial ratios which have taken all the three financial years into accounts to compare with the CG disclosure scores.
Analysis of Financial Ratios of the Sample of Hong Kong Based Family-Controlled Property Development Companies
For the Hong Kong based property development companies, the overall profitability of Cheung Kong, Sun Hung Kai, Hung Lung, New World and Hopewell improved with an increasing trend in OPM and NPM. However, others have an adverse profitability, except for Sino Land with an increase in OPM and NPM.
On the other hand, New World gets the lowest average scores in OPM and NPM respectively.
At the same time, Hopewell gets the highest average score in NPM. Following by this, Hysan scores at the highest average financial ratio in OPM.
Analysis of Financial Ratios the Sample of China Based Family-Controlled Property Development Companies
For the China based property development companies, China Resources Land, China
Overseas, Guangzhou R & F, Sinolink and Neo-China Land improved the profitability with an increasing OPM and NPM. And so did Hopson and SRE.
On the other hand, Neo-China Land gets the lowest average score in OPM. China Resources
Land and SRE get the lowest average scores in NPM respectively. However, SRE gets the highest average scores in OPM. Simultaneously, Sinolink, New World China and Guangzhou
Investment get the highest average scores in NPM.
Relationship between CG Disclosure and Financial Performance of the Sample Companies
After the analysis of the quality of CG disclosure and the financial ratios of the sample companies, the relationship between them is examined. First, the correlation is calculated which is shown in Table 5 . Only OPM and NPM have a medium to high positive correlation with CG disclosure. This evidence supports the analysis of the relationship between CG disclosure and financial performance in the followings. The overall scores in CG disclosure in Hong Kong based property development companies are consistent during the three subsequent financial year end, while the profitability is subject to fluctuations with increasing or decreasing trend in the financial ratios generally.
The final scores of CG disclosure do not have significant differences among Wharf, Great Other than this, Hopewell and Great Eagle score at the highest in the total of five types of financial ratios. Thus, the small range of the CG disclosure scores is inconsistent with the considerable differences in the scores of financial ratios among these companies. It does not seem to have a relationship between CG disclosure and financial ratios.
Besides, Hysan gets the highest scores while Sun Hung Kai gets the lowest. However, Hysan has an opposite trend in the profitability and only get the average highest scores in OPM among companies. Furthermore, Sun Hung Kai has an increasing trend in profitability instead.
Hence, it seems to have a little relationship between CG disclosure and financial ratios other than with OPM.
To conclude, the data only indicate partially support for H1 which is the positive relationship between CG disclosure and financial performance of the Hong Kong based family-controlled property development companies. There are two financial ratios -OPM and NPM, indicate the positive relationship between them and CG disclosure while others do not. These findings apply to the Literature Review that CG disclosure requirements help in monitoring the controlling shareholders and protecting the minority shareholders (Ho, 2003) , in together with improving the profitability to some extent (Chen et al., 2006 ).
In the China based family-controlled property development companies, the relationship between CG disclosure and financial performance is first examined by the calculation of the correlation. It is shown in Table 6 . World China does not get the highest or the lowest scores in CG disclosure but it gets the highest average scores in NPM. At the same time, Agile and Hopson get a medium score of financial ratios among the companies. Hence, the small range of the CG disclosure scores is inconsistent with the considerable differences in the scores of financial ratios among these companies.
On the other hand, SRE, Neo-China Land and Sinolink are the three of the lowest scores in CG disclosure with consistency in the three financial years examined. Simultaneously, SRE and Neo-China Land get the lowest average scores in OPM and NPM respectively. Oppositely, SRE and Sinolink get the highest average scores in OPM which is inconsistent with the lowest scores of CG disclosure they get. Thus, the lowest scores in CG disclosure do not indicate the lowest or the highest scores in financial ratios.
Furthermore, Neo-China Land and Sinolink have the increasing trend in OPM and NPM, while SRE has the increasing trend in OPM and NPM. The overall improvement in profitability is not conformable with the consistence in the CG disclosure scores in the three financial years.
To conclude, the data do not indicate support for H2 which is the positive relationship between CG disclosure and financial performance in the China based family-controlled property development companies listed on SEHK. These findings apply to the Literature Review that even if CG disclosure requirements help in monitoring the controlling shareholders and protecting the minority shareholders (Ho, 2003) , it does not affect the financial performance of the family-controlled companies (Filatotchev et al., 2005) .
Conclusions
CG concerns the rights and responsibilities of a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders (OECD, 1999) . It is derived by agency theory which the agency problems aroused due to the conflicts of interests between management, directors and shareholders, and the stakeholder theory that the corporation should take into account of all the stakeholders' interests.
CG mechanism and CG disclosure play important roles in reducing the agency threats, monitoring the controlling shareholders and protecting the interests of minority shareholders (Ho, 2003) . Hence, the performance of the family-controlled companies is affected.
Nevertheless, the divergence exists in the relationship between CG and performance that some scholars suggest the positive relationship between them but others disagree (Kula and Tatoglu, 2006; Filatotchev et al., 2005) .
Considering the divergence of the view in the relationship between CG and performance and lack of this type of research in Hong Kong, there is a gap in the existing literature. However, it is taking into account that CG disclosure is a powerful tool to influence the behavior of the company and protect the minority shareholders (HKSA, 2001) . It is used in investigating the relationship with financial performance. Hence, the hypotheses are set and test the positive relationship between them in both Hong Kong based and China based family-controlled property development companies listed on SEHK which are representative companies in Hong Kong.
In the Hong Kong based companies, the data collected from the scores of CG disclosure and financial ratios only indicate partially support for H1 which is the positive relationship between CG disclosure and financial performance. There are only two financial ratios -OPM and NPM, indicate the positive relationship. The consistency scores in CG disclosure do not conform to the fluctuation of the trends in the financial ratios during the three financial year ends 1 . Also, the small differences in the scores of CG disclosure among the companies are not consistent with the significant differences in the scores of financial ratios. However, there is an indication that the highest scores in CG disclosure get the highest scores in both OPM and NPM. As a result, there is only a positive relationship between CG disclosure and OPM and NPM. H1 is partially supported. These findings apply to the Literature Review that CG disclosure requirements help in monitoring the controlling shareholders and protecting the minority shareholders (Ho, 2003) , and improving the profitability to some extent (Chen et al., 2006 ).
In the China based companies, the data form the scores of CG disclosure and financial ratios do not indicate support for H2 which is the positive relationship between CG disclosure and financial performance. First, it is supported by the calculation of correlation in Microsoft Excel.
Second, the small differences in the scores of CG disclosure are inconsistent with the considerable differences in the scores of financial ratios among these companies. Third, the lowest scores in CG disclosure do not indicate the lowest or the highest scores in financial ratios. These findings apply to the Literature Review that even if CG disclosure requirements help in monitoring the controlling shareholders and protecting the minority shareholders (Ho, 2003) , it does not affect the financial performance of the family-controlled companies (Filatotchev et al., 2005) .
